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The Concise Argument
Lucy Frith
This issue of the Journal of Medical covers 
a range of ethical issues and care settings 
making the task of beginning to summarise 
these papers challenging. They reflect the 
diversity of our field, representing different 
branches of bioethics focussing on specific 
areas or topics using a variety of method-
ologies: but how do we categorise these 
branches of bioethics? What demarks one 
branch from another? And what func-
tion do such categorisations fulfil? From 
the early days of medical ethics we now 
have a growing proliferation of different 
branches, from those with a more specific 
focus: clinical ethics, global ethics, nursing 
ethics, public health ethics for example, 
to a widening out, in terms of bioethics 
becoming the broader usage and medical 
ethics sitting within that. More recently, a 
new area of ethical focus has arisen, One 
Health, the subject of Johnson and Degel-
ing’s article in this issue. They define One 
Health as follows: ‘One Health is gener-
ally construed as an integrated approach 
to understanding and managing disease. 
Although primarily associated with the 
prevention and control of Emerging Infec-
tious Diseases, the approach is also rele-
vant to dealing with endemic and zoonotic 
animal diseases, as well as securing food 
safety. In its most comprehensive form, it 
extends to fostering the health of humans, 
animals and their shared environments.’
This raises, in many ways, a different 
set of ethical concerns from those usually 
encountered in bioethics and medical 
ethics and this leads Johnson and Degeling 
to ask whether One Health merits having 
its own ‘ethical framework’. They use 
ethical frameworks in two senses: as value 
neutral deliberative tools and as embodying 
values, and consider how each  usage 
could be applied in One Health. In terms 
of the first usage they state: ‘When ethical 
frameworks are regarded as a procedural 
tool then, the One Health perspective 
can broaden and strengthen consider-
ations to be included in the mix within 
existing ethical frameworks deployed in 
bioethics and public health.’ In terms of 
the second usage of ethical frameworks, 
as embodying values, they note that One 
Health could generate its own framework, 
‘with additional premises, central tenets 
from One Health can support normative 
claims, and further, One Health is sugges-
tive of change in the ethical and public 
health policy status quo.’ They present a 
number of arguments for generating this 
kind of framework and point out that by 
not adopting its own normative frame-
work, One Health is not living up to its 
potential: ‘There is much productive work 
that can be done by philosophers in teasing 
out and working up the hitherto underex-
plored values of One Health and in trying 
to work out how it might be possible to 
sort through and prioritise the completing 
claims of a One Health ethics.’ However, 
ultimately, they remain agnostic about the 
project of developing a specific normative 
framework for One Health.
One Health encourages us to think 
more broadly about the effects of our 
behaviours and the implications of and on 
the wider eco sphere and the links between 
human and animal health, and this is an 
exciting development in bioethics. It also 
raises interesting questions of where it sits 
in the field of bioethics, and applied ethics 
more broadly, and what, if any, distinct 
contributions it might make to bioethical 
inquiry.
There has been a long-standing debate 
over what constitutes a particular sub-set 
or branch of applied ethics and what does 
and should differentiate particular areas 
of focus. As Verweij & Bovenkert1 note 
bioethics has become increasingly special-
ised. An argument for needing these 
discrete branches, or communities of prac-
tice, such as clinical ethics or global ethics 
is, taking Lillehammer’s2 ‘division of intel-
lectual labour argument’ and reworking 
it: that having an expertise in a particular 
area and developing this through sustained 
work gives any resulting ethical analysis a 
texture and closeness to the realities of 
practice that it might otherwise lack. This 
is clearly necessary to say sensible things 
that those working in the area will find 
useful. One of the reasons that Verweij 
& Bovenkert1 see for this increasing 
specialisation in bioethics is the rise in 
more empirical perspectives that require a 
more finely tuned appreciation and under-
standing of the subject matter. Thus, an 
argument for One Health being a distinc-
tive area of bioethics could draw on this 
kind of justification - it pays attention and 
develops expertise in an area, although 
broad and inter-disciplinary, of scientific 
development, practice and policy. One 
Health raises distinctive ethical concerns 
from those usually addressed in bioethics. 
It takes a much wider approach to the 
context of ethical issues, bringing in not 
only animals, and how they interact with 
humans, but also the natural environ-
ment. These concerns could link into 
animal ethics and environmental ethics 
and debates over wider responsibilities 
to future generations and the global eco 
sphere. For people working in this area, 
a detailed knowledge of the context in 
which these issues and dilemmas play out 
would be necessary, as they are a long 
way away from traditional medical ethics 
debates located in the narrow confines 
of medical practice. This is one of the 
reasons the authors give for thinking in 
these terms: ‘One of the strengths of One 
Health is that the approach draws atten-
tion to an environmental dimension which 
may be relevant in ethical decision-making 
but which, despite initial prominence in 
domains like bioethics, appears to have 
slipped off the disciplinary agenda.’
While prima facie it seems sensible to 
develop context-based expertise, how we 
categorise this focus, whether it be a clin-
ical area such as reproductive medicine 
or a level of clinical interaction,  such as 
the doctor-patient relationship, deter-
mines and predetermines the scope of the 
inquiry. By basing ethics around estab-
lished medical categories, such as psychi-
atric ethics or paediatric ethics, we may 
already be closing off ways of seeing and 
conceptualising the issues. For instance, 
we may become bound by biomedical 
disease categories that foreclose avenues 
of analysis and certain types of solutions. 
Further, focussing on a particular level of 
encounter, like  the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, may mean that certain questions 
do not become apparent. This has been 
the impetus for new branches of bioethics, 
such as organisational ethics and public 
health ethics. For example, by having the 
organisation as the focus of ethical anal-
ysis, organisational ethics is able to open 
up new questions and areas that might 
not otherwise be considered. An example 
of this is the recognition that individual 
healthcare professionals’ actions and deci-
sion-making take place within a prescribed 
organisational context – while they can 
react to this context – the context shapes 
the options available and how ‘appropriate’ 
responses are constructed and delineated. 
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Spencer et al3 point out that the construc-
tion of this context, the hierarchical struc-
tures of the healthcare organisations, 
power relations, finance, personnel issues 
and the ethical implication of these are 
often not addressed by medical or clin-
ical ethics and hence: ‘There is a dramatic 
need for a broader conception of ethics in 
Healthcare Organisations.’ Public health 
ethics has similarly sought to focus atten-
tion on populations rather than individ-
uals and reconceptualise concepts of the 
human good.4 One Health ethics could 
perform a similar role of opening up areas 
for ethical consideration, re-orientating 
existing ‘ethics’ towards the relation-
ship between humans and animals, and 
broader ecological considerations. The 
development of One Health ethics could 
be seen as part of Robert Lyman Potter’s5 
stages in the evolution of bioethics. He 
argues that bioethics needs to be expanded 
to consider the wider sociological context 
of healthcare systems and this is, a ‘turn 
towards a broader ecological version of 
bioethics.’ This version of bioethics sees 
issues in their broader context – an ecolog-
ical vision that constructs individuals as 
biosocial organisms operating in a wider 
ecosphere – elements that are crucial for 
a thorough ethical analysis. These levels 
are not a progression or a set of steps, but 
‘one must move back and forth from the 
various levels to maximise interaction of 
the various levels.’5
A further reason for dividing areas 
of ethical concern into categories is that 
different areas might need different kinds 
of theoretical tools to approach them. To 
use the previous example of organisational 
ethics, it has been argued that the theo-
retical tool kit of medical and clinical 
ethics, often focused on patient autonomy, 
does not have the theoretical resources 
to consider the ethics of organisations. 
Werhane has argued that different theo-
ries are needed to think through organisa-
tional ethics and makes the case for using 
stakeholder theory: ‘Stakeholder theory 
provides a moral framework for evaluating 
not only stakeholder relationships but also 
evaluating organisations, their missions, 
and their value-creating activities. Thus 
stakeholder theory initiates thinking about 
organisation ethics for healthcare, while 
including the stakeholder dimensions 
of professional, clinical, and managerial 
ethics.’6 Work in public health ethics has 
also sought to draw on different theories 
and theoretical framings, such as social 
justice, solidarity, reciprocity, contrac-
tarianism, welfare forms of consequen-
tialism, accounts of human flourishing 
and capabilities, and ideas of public and 
common goods.4 One Health ethics 
might also need to draw on a different 
kind of theoretical cannon, that can more 
adequately cope with considering ethical 
issues across human, animal and environ-
mental domains. Using developments in 
systems and complexity theory that are 
able to theorise how different systems 
interact and co-evolve could be one area 
to explore.7 As Verweij & Bovenkert1 note 
the, ‘One Health perspective implies that 
evaluating health policies merely from 
a (human) public health ethics view will 
not be sufficient.’ Whether this means 
that One Health should develop its own 
ethical framework, in the normative sense, 
and what kinds of theoretical tools are 
best suited to examining the ethical issues 
raised by this  perspective, are areas that 
need more debate and discussion. One 
Health could prompt the development 
of moral theories that might enable us to 
think more constructively about how to 
address the ethical issues and challenges 
raised by this inter-disciplinary area. 
Whether this area becomes a new branch 
of bioethics and how it develops remain 
to be seen, but this kind of debate needs 
to  happen so that bioethics can continue 
to evolve and be responsive to new soci-
etal challenges.
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